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Abstract 
The affordability of the microfinance, Islamic and conventional, is questionable. The review of empirical 
studies thus far shows that the majority of them are expensive and only some of them are cheap and 
successful. Only those, which have less cost, can afford to make microfinance cheap and hence not only 
affordable but also have the prospect of assisting the poor, effectively releasing them from their cycle of 
poverty. To make an Islamic microfinance programme cheaper, alternatives are found in the literature, and 
the manner in which the costs of Islamic microfinance schemes through offer of sustained grants and 
subsidy for the cost of capital and operational costs is proposed.  Zakat and sadaqah funds are proposed for 
grants and subsidy while awqaf funds are proposed for loans and investment in microenterprises. 
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1.0 Introduction 
We refer to microfinance as a financing service designed to assist the poor. Poor would 
refer to the group with a household living on less than five American dollars.
1
 Small financial 
loans are often given to the poor for meeting their needs and necessities, post disaster remedy, 
personal emergencies and investment opportunities
2
 (Rutherford, 2000). The borrower could own 
land and building or could be unbankable, and thus the loan could be with or without collateral, or 
group guarantee, or through savings before the grant of loan. 
Microfinance products and services were praised for helping the poor “maintain and 
improve their human and social capital throughout their lives” (Matin, Hulme, & Rutherford, 
1999). These products have been in the market since the 70s of the 20
th
 century. Nevertheless, not 
much has been changed since then, as poverty is still high and the GDP of Muslim countries 
(World Bank, 2012) is disappointing except that in petro-economies of the gulf. The gaps between 
the top and bottom twenties of a nation, or those living on below five American Dollars are even 
more alarming. 
1
 We do not consider the $1.90 a day (2011) of the World Bank to be the necessary criteria for getting loans 
by the poor from the microfinance organizations. 
2
  Such as weddings, funerals, childbirth, education, homebuilding, widowhood, old age; sickness, injury, 
unemployment, theft, harassment or death; fires, floods, cyclones and man-made events like war or 
bulldozing of dwellings; expanding a business, buying land or equipment, improving housing, securing a 
job (which often requires paying a large bribe), etc. 
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The conventional micro-financing entities are criticized (Morduch & Haley, 2002; Amin 
et al, 2003; Roodman & Morduch, 2009; Young, 2010) for making high profits at the expense of 
the poor (Mishra, 2006; Vakulabharanam, 2005) and the merit of Islamic microfinance is 
debatable (Mitias, 2009). It is viewed costlier in the Middle East due to the cost of capital and 
transactions, and cheaper in Bangladesh for the lack of it (UNDEP, 2012). Hence, mix demand for 
Islamic microfinance in Islamic countries is reported: in the Middle East, for example, more than 
60 per cent in the West Bank and Gaza, an estimated 40% in Yemen, 24.9–32% in Jordan, and 
20.7% in Algeria preferred Islamic products (Karim et al, 2008). In spite of critique, Muslims 
would prefer Islamic microfinance, if it were relatively cheaper for reasons of risk sharing, profit 
sharing, fixed repayment rate, transparency, social welfare and justice (Mahaini, 2012). The main 
concern is the high cost of microfinance, which is justified among others based on operational 
costs. 
 
Few Muslim scholars considered the integration of waqf, zakat and other charitable 
donations into Islamic microfinance to make it cheaper. Nevertheless, these studies do not explore 
which of the costs could be paid from the Islamic charitable funds and whether such it is a 
sustainable solution. This paper therefore aims to identify the types of costs that could be paid out 
of consumptive and repayable grants and credits. Attempt is also made to identify which type of 
charitable funds and their subclasses could be used for subsidy of costs, in terms of consumptive 
and repayable grants or loans. To do so, this paper in its first section reviews the literature 
explaining the current scenario about the costly microfinance (conventional and Islamic), its 
causes and the burden on borrowers. In the second section, the paper reviews the current opinions 
as well as expands the same ideas further in order to achieve the aim of this study. The authors 
also suggest policy proposals and further research. 
 
1.1 The Cost OF Islamic Micro Financial Institutions 
 
This section explains the costs of capital and operations, sustainability of fund and the 
affordability of the microfinance offered by Islamic Micro Financing Institutions (IsMFI) and 
conventional Micro Financing Institutions (MFI). 
1.2  Lender’s costs in conventional MFIs 
 
MFIs have two types of costs: cost of capital and cost of expenses. The cost of capital 
consists of the interest paid to investors. Usually they pay 4.5% to 6% on savings (Acha, 2012; 
Schumpeter, 2013). The operational costs are the financial transactions costs incurred by MFI in 
the field (supervision and monitoring) and in the headquarters. These are often called service 
charges and “include the administrative costs of making payments, keeping open offices, cost of 
loan monitoring, etc.”. Gonzalez (2007) opines that profits in the capital cost is less than 8% 
while operating expenses amount to 63%, and financial expenses are 21%. 
1.2 Borrower’s Costs under conventional MFIs 
 
Global empirical studies show a variant range of interests and charges. The lower costs of 
conventional microfinance is at the rate of 8% and higher costs at 100%. In India the cost of funds 
is up to 60% by moneylenders, and up to 36% by NGOs (S.C.Vetrivel & S. Chandra 
Kumarmangalam, 2010). In Nigeria and Mexico microfinance banks charge interest at the rate of 
30% to 100% on loans (Acha, 2012; Schumpeter, 2013). Up to 1996, the lending rate of interest 
by Grameen Bank was between 11%-17% despite heavy subsidies from donors (Morduch, 1999). 
It has been reported that, since 1996 Grameen Bank has increased its interest rate by 21% to avoid 
dependence on external subsidies. The government of Bangladesh has imposed a 12.5% flat 
interest rate (Iftekhar Hossain, 2006) and  in 2010 the Grameen Bank disclosed its interest rate 
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between 8% to 20%, and sometimes interest free loan to the ultra poor (Counts, 2010). The 
effective rate may be 30% as claimed by Schreiner (1999).
3
  
  
Ehrbeck, Leijon, & Gaul (2011) confirmed the interest rates at the range below 0%-15% 
and above 60%. They also found that the majority of MFIs expect 30% return, regardless whether 
they are provided by for-profit or not-for-profit organizations. Charging 36% interest rate by an 
MFI is considered reasonable (Erase Poverty, (n.d.). It is explained below. 
Contributing factors to the high costs of microfinance are: (1) borrowing costs and (2) operating 
costs. Both are passed to borrowers. The borrowing costs mean (i) the interest that an MFI pays to 
external fund providers and depositors of the given MFI and (ii) the interest charged by an MFI. 
The MFI charges interest when it lends available funds (equity and other funds). Thus if the 
institution uses external funds, the cost of the loan would be double (i.e. the borrowing cost, and 
the interest charged by MFI). 
 
There are other costs, such as shaming, additional borrowing and payment of interest for 
two loans and losses of income, that need to be considered. For instance, physical collateral is 
replaced with group guarantee (Ahmad, 2007); the employees of an MFI may use harsh collection 
methods. Additionally, group pressure over their members may cause humiliation and eventually 
may force the members to quit. To pay for the previous loan new credit may be obtained from 
other source. Thereafter, the cost of the credit, then, may increase. 
Over all one can see the existence of very high interest rate. Even the reasonable rate of Erase 
Poverty (n.d.) seems expensive considering comparing it to normal banking rates. Indeed, it is 
very high after considering the humble income of the borrowers. Therefore, one can conclude that 
there could be cases where microfinance is a mere liability and entrapment of the poor in their 
perpetual misery. 
 
1.4 Islamic Microfinance 
  
Is Islamic Microfinance expensive too? The answer to this question could be relative: 
relative to the rate of competitors and the income of the borrower. First the cost, and affordability 
followed by the dilemma of sustainability. 
 
1.4.1 The cost of borrowing 
 
Two views are expressed about the cost of borrowing from IsMFIs. On one hand, studies 
in the Middle East have found the cost of Islamic microcredit to be higher than the conventional 
institutions. On the other hand, in other countries the cost of credit looks lower. 
 
For instance, Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (modeled on Grameen Bank but offers qard hasan and 
charges ujr) charges 
4
%-10% (Omar, Rindam, & Nor, 2012). Malaysian banks, which also offer 
microfinance, charge between 1.5%-17% (Norma & Azizah, 2009). Both of these are comparable 
to the rates offered for loans to bankable persons.  Even better, the Akhuwat of Pakistan charges 
5%
4
 (Allen & Overy, 2009) due to their extremely efficient services (Allen & Overy, 2009; 
                                                 
3
 Schreiner (1999) claimed the Annual reports of Grameen Bank are not transparant with 
intent to make the bank look different from moneylenders, and avoid questions from 
donors that the borrowers may be burdened. He thought the bank needs no subsidies as it 
earned 30% annually based on its effective interest rates it charges. This and the savings 
are not declared income for the fear of being taxed. 
 
4
 It is the understanding of the writers that recently Akhwat is offering zero interest loans for the same 
reasons. Costs are covered by the donations of its graduate borrowers.   
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Kazim & Haider, 2012). Abdul Rahman, A. (2007) proposed Murabahah and musharakah based 
microfinance. It is said that the cost of finance in Bangladesh is between 10%-12.2% (UNDP, 
2012), if one assumes it is the effective rate. 
 
The most common rate of the cost of microfinance by Amanah Ikhtiar is at 11%, slightly 
higher than what Allen & Overy (2009) has asserted i.e. 4%-10%. In our sample of limited 
respondents, we only found one borrower to have been charged at the rate of 8.3%, and some 
seemed to be charged as high as 18.3%, but such results would not be conclusive as the sample 
was small from two locations. We also examined this in the context of long-term and short-term 
loans, and in comparison with that of normal banks. It seemed expensive, compared to 5% offered 
by normal banks. We tested the cost of capital for a home loan for a period of five years at 
prevailing interest rates (between 4.8%-5.9 % BLR offered by normal banks) with that of Amanah 
Ikhtiar Malaysia, which was estimated at 11%-12%.
5
 We found that by the end of the fifth year, 
the borrower has to repay to the bank RM50,000 plus RM6,339 which means the conventional 
bank charges were at the rate of 12.6%. This indicated that the actual rate of Amanah Ikhtiar was 
slightly cheaper, provided the term of loan is not less than one year. Loans disbursed for shorter 
terms may be expensive and hence may cause defaults. The reason is that Amanah Ikhtiar charges 
fixed service charge at 11% of the amount lent. Considering the variant rates based on the amount 
borrowed, and the term paid (Hup Chan, 2010), the findings of Mukhtar (2012) may explain why 
some borrowers defaulted; as it would be consonant to the view that project failure is related to 
the level of interest rates (Obaidullah, 2008a). 
 
In the case of IsMFI, service charges and the ratio of profit and loss sharing might be 
considered the cost of capital. The rate of profit sharing between IsMFI and lender may be low or 
high. In either case, the higher the cost incurred by an MFI the more expensive it would be for the 
borrower. 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that Islamic Micro Finance is relatively cheaper than 
conventional micro credit as the highest rate of profit is reported at 18%. This is lower than 
20%/21% of Grameen Bank or 36% of rate accepted by Erase Poverty (n.d). Nevertheless, in 
Malaysia, it seems both conventional and Islamic MFIs offer cheaper rates when compared with 
rates charged by firms located outside Malaysia. Some government-subsidised loans were even 
cheaper than Amanah Ikhtiar, which runs based on qard hasan, ujr, and takaful products. 
 
Theoretically, IsMFIs should be cheaper. They may have received cheap credit and 
sometimes cost free. They demand borrowers to open saving deposit accounts with IsMFIs, and 
demand borrowers to be insured, and therefore risks are minimized. Furthermore, IsMFIs charge 
fixed service charges (ujr), if the transaction involves qard hasan. They also expect profit in other 
cases. Some transactions are based on profit and loss sharing. Ideally therefore the cost of capital 
to the borrower should be subsidized and be lower. 
 
It is significant to note that the cost of an Islamic microfinance should not be evaluated 
based on the rate offered by a conventional commercial bank alone. Neither the justification of the 
cost of capital and operation should be sufficient for promotion of IsMFIs products. They must be 
evaluated based on the affordability of the borrowers and helping them escape from economic 
misery. The following discussion is based on affordability and economic development. 
 
2.0 Discussion 
 
                                                 
5
 We examined a loan given by Amanah Ikhtiar for RM10,000, but releasing to the borrower only 
RM9,802. They withheld 0.019% of the total sum for takaful and hibah (called halal). The borrower has to 
pay RM11,000, plus a weekly savings of RM15. Considering the RM10,000 loan, and RM1,000 as the 
ujrah (as they call it) the cost of the ujrah and others reached up to 11%. 
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Microfinance prices are higher than banking (El Tabaa, n.d.). There is concern about the 
expensiveness of microcredit (Islamic and conventional) and borrowers’ inability to repay 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1998; Hardy et al, 2002; Ahmad 2007; Obaidullah, 2008a). We therefore 
thought that the merit of an Islamic micro finance should be judged based on the ability of the 
borrower to repay the loan with ease and improvement in his prosperity. The latter is discussed 
first. 
2.1  Affordability and borrower’s prosperity  
 
We did not find clear answers from some previous studies in regard to affordability of the 
loans offered by Islamic Micro Financing Institutions. Ahmad (2002) mentions the economic 
impact of loans in terms of paying with money, increase in volume of goods/services, 
diversification into new goods/services, increase in assets, improved premises but he is silent on 
the burden of repayment and others. Studies in Malaysia (Fazidah, (2011); Norma, and Jarita 
(2009) Kasim, 2002, Salma 2006; and Omar, Rindam, and Nor, 2012; Mokhtar, 2012; Haneef, 
Pramanikb, Mohammed, Dahiru, & Amin 2013), Bangladesh (Khandker, Samad and Khan, 1998), 
Ghana and South Africa (Afrane, 2002) indicate the increase of income and expenditure at a range 
of 50%-215% after the loans were given. However they do not prove whether such increase was 
after the deduction of loan payment or otherwise. These and other studies show relatively 
substantial number of defaulters and dropped out from the programme, as well as borrowers being 
unable to be zakatable. These make Islamic MFIs suspect of being unaffordable. 
 
Where a loan is unaffordable, loan default or over indebtedness may occur. This is in line 
with the findings of Haneef, et al (2013) that certain Malaysian borrowers opted for additional 
loans, and that a substantial number of them considered themselves indebted. This study is 
relatively clear by showing that more than one third of the borrowers, if sole breadwinners, would 
remain below poverty line (earning less than RM900), a substantial majority did not know 
whether the programme was beneficial to them or if it is Islamic. Besides, Norma and Azizah 
(2009) surveying 1,803 program participants in Malaysia found that 42.7% felt they were either 
indifferent or worse. Their study does not shed light on the ability of the participants to pay their 
loans, or on the reasons why the 42% of the population were unable to escape from poverty. 
 
Unless rebutted empirically, one may presume that the lack of change in the economic 
wellbeing of the borrowers may be an indicator of unaffordability of the microloans offered by 
IsMFIs as the surplus would add to their savings or disposable income which can be used for 
purchasing more goods or services. 
2.2  Affordability and Defaults 
 
Whether or not a loan is affordable, and easily repayable, one has to consider the total 
monthly income of the borrower. For purpose of affordability, one has to look at the said income 
and the amount paid for repayment of loan and other charges related to the said loan. Where the 
deduction for gross periodical repayment (loan repayment, savings, and others) makes the 
borrower unable to pay for the costs of necessaries, and liabilities to third party, then it would be 
unaffordable and expensive according to the criteria for affordability of housing loans. We use 
this notwithstanding the fact that such a criteria is high considering that the borrower has to pay 
for housing and other expenses too, which may push his/her monthly deductions to 60%. 
 
Considering, in Malaysia, the average monthly income of these groups, between RM500-
RM1,500 (Haneef, Pramanikb, Mohammed, Dahiru, & Amin 2013), and the loans for a week 
(Davis, n.d), for a year (Mokhtar, 2012), and 3 years (Omar, 2012), small loans given on a very 
short-term basis would be less affordable. One would doubt the claim of 50%-215% of increase in 
income could solve the question of unaffordability. Haneef, et al (2013) confirm that a substantial 
segment of their pilot study was facing difficulty to repay their loans and remained poor. 
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Default over repayment is estimated at 39% in the Caribbean (Lashley, 2004), 40% in 
Bangladesh (i.e. Grameen Bank) despite the fact that the given bank declares it at 2% of the 
current total rate of loans disbursed (Morduch, 1999) and Ethiophia 5%. In Malaysia the rate of 
defaults is between 2%-20% even though the rate of periodical instalments is not as high as in 
other countries. 
 
Several interconnected factors can cause loan defaults. Shu-Teng et al. (2015) have 
categorized them based on characteristics of borrowers, business, loans, and lenders. They include 
the following: Small loans (Brehanu & Fufa, 2008; Shu-Teng et al, 2015), and longer period of 
loans (Roslan & Abd Karim, 2009), shorter period of loans, higher sum of weekly instalments i.e. 
more than RM200 for low income earners and agricultural loans (Mokhtar et al, 2012) are the 
reasons for non-repayment. Other reasons are non-timely disbursement of loan, and low number 
of supervisory visits (Okorie, 1986). Ahmad, (2007), Chaudhary & Ishaq, (2003) identified 
defaults due to loan for non-productive purpose, and higher interest (Ahmad, 2007). Small 
business: lower business revenue, less productivity and income (Brehanu & Fufa, 2008; Okorie, 
1986), education level (Shu-Teng et al, 2015), youth and less experience (Mokhtar Et al, 2012). 
Some of these factors are linkable to unaffordability of the loan.  
 
Higher cost of borrowing is a challenge (Reta, 2011). The repayment of the loans, the cost 
of the loans at 4%-100%, and savings and other costs may amount to higher weekly payments, 
which may cause loan defaults because of lower income, especially when the term of loan is 
between a week to a year. Consequent to default, penalty may be imposed and increased interest 
may be charged. For these, more money may be borrowed and this eventually may result in over-
indebtedness. 
 
Time magazine has reported indebtedness of borrowers. No more 99% repay; it is 
increasing (Knowledge@Wharton, 2012). The magazine has reported over-indebtedness and over 
borrowing from several MFIs, default on repayment, due to “exorbitant interest rates” or 
expensive credit by not-for-profit and for-profit MFIs and banks’ “increasing competition”. 
Borrowers have also committed suicide. The borrowers from Grameen Bank borrow from others 
to service their debt to the bank, which was later considered to be “sucking blood from the poor in 
the name of poverty alleviation”. In India, the repayment system of 50 weekly equal instalments 
is considered not practical because the poor do not have stable jobs or if the communities are 
agrarian. Pressure for high repayment drives members to moneylenders (Vetrivel & 
Kumarmangalam, 2010). Jain, and Mansuri (2003) put it in this way: “Since the borrower knows 
that repayment must begin almost immediately after loan disbursement, and typically much 
before project returns are realized, she must be able to access funds to finance the instalment”. 
The negative effect of this is reported too; a string of borrowers have committed suicides over 
alleged “exploitation”, and “harsh collection tactics”. 
 
Over-debtedness is the worst of all results one can expect from an MFI. This ties the 
borrower to the lender, which is a trap that cripples borrowers.  If so, it will not only be 
considered a contemporary form of slavery but it may also bring down the given MFI, as it would 
not be able to lend funds and hence become unsustainable. Both of these two consequences have 
to be avoided by an IsMFI. Therefore for the sake of avoiding the above consequences, the 
authors suggest supplementary measures that need to be added to the current structure of 
microcredit and micro financing. 
 
 
3.0 Sustainability 
 
Some writers are concerned with sustainability of MFIS. However, this should not be 
achieved at the expense of borrowers by charging higher interest or profit rates. Higher cost of 
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lending to the poor may be viewed not only as burdening the borrower but also is a risk to the 
sustainability of the MFI or IsMFI itself. Therefore, efficiency in both aspects is desirable. 
 
There could be no cost if MFI has its own capital, but it will necessarily have operational 
expenses. To Gonzalez (2007), MFI characteristics and country characteristics play important 
roles in the efficiency of an MFI. The size of loan, the number of borrowers (MFI size), the 
maturity of MFI, and the number of borrowers per employee are the drivers of efficiency. The 
larger the number of sum borrowed, the broader the borrowers’ base is and the greater the number 
of borrowers per employee, the higher is the age of maturity of the MFI, and the less expensive 
are the loans. On a country level, good physical infrastructure (roads, electricity, the rate of 
electricity outage etc.), and higher density of target population, good financial infrastructure 
(institutional), price and better availability of inputs, efficiently doing business, and good 
macroeconomic environment helps the MFI reduce its costs of operations. 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
 
The merit of an Islamic micro finance should be judged based on the ability of the 
borrower to repay the loan with ease and improve the dispensable income of the borrower. This 
may be achieved if the IsMFI could (a) rely on interest free loans, (b) have dedicated charitable 
funds for microfinance, (c) provide loan for enterprise, and sustenance, (d) grant small loans for a 
term exceeding one year, and (e) lower service charges. The result of this would be avoiding cost 
of capital, reducing the number of defaulters due to higher repayment amount, access money for 
sustenance, saving or having surplus income, and therefore improves their standard of living 
through new prosperity achieved by way of the affordable loan. 
 
The costs of MFIs are said to be higher than commercial banks. Higher cost of lending to 
the poor in traditional MFIs is justified on organizational sustainability and freedom from 
subsidies. However, higher cost of borrowing by the poor should be viewed not only as a burden 
on the borrower but also a risk to the sustainability of the MFI or IsMFI itself. This vicious circle 
can be avoided by incorporating the Islamic philosophy of economic system. Attention has to be 
paid to the difference between the two systems. While in a neoliberal economic system a subsidy-
free sustainability may seem to be the built-in components of the system, in Islam, the built-in 
component of its economic system is subsidies through zakat, waqf, and other donations. 
Incorporating all the three in an IsMFIs should be viewed the means for sustainability of the 
organization. 
 
Additional efficiency tool however could not be disregarded. Several efficiency measures 
can be taken to reduce the costs of operation, and therefore keep the organization sustained. This 
also include reducing the number of human resource in headquarters and regional centers, cutting 
down on excessive traveling, holding training in big groups and monitoring loans from the center 
while undertaking collection through online banking. Banking practices can be learned and 
adopted to improve cost efficiency. Islamic microfinance may thrive if it starts operation under 
waqf where normal banking activities could subsidize the cost of operation. This will benefit the 
public and charitable organizations by making available charity funds to the deserving poor. To 
ascertain the above, further research in the effectiveness of the above ideas can be conducted 
especially on the role of charitable funds such as zakat and waqf and the operation of 
microfinance by a waqf bank. 
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